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abstract: Two important questions about mutualisms are how the
fitness costs and benefits to the mutualist partners are determined
and how these mechanisms affect the evolutionary dynamics of the
mutualism. We tackle these questions with a model of the legumerhizobium symbiosis that regards the mutualism outcome as a result
of biochemical negotiations between the plant and its nodules. We
explore the fitness consequences of this mechanism to the plant and
rhizobia and obtain four main results. First, negotiations permit the
plant to differentially reward more-cooperative rhizobia—a phenomenon termed “plant sanctions”—but only when more-cooperative
rhizobia also provide the plant with good outside options during
negotiations with other nodules. Second, negotiations may result in
seemingly paradoxical cases where the plant is worse off when it has
a “choice” between two strains of rhizobia than when infected by
either strain alone. Third, even when sanctions are effective, they are
by themselves not sufficient to maintain cooperative rhizobia in a
population: less cooperative strains always have an advantage at the
population level. Finally, partner fidelity feedback, together with genetic correlations between a rhizobium strain’s cooperativeness and
the outside options it provides, can maintain cooperative rhizobia.
Our results show how joint control over the outcome of a mutualism
through the proximate mechanism of negotiation can affect the evolutionary dynamics of interspecific cooperation.
Keywords: sanctions, partner choice, partner fidelity feedback, biological markets, partner control, context dependency.

Introduction
Evolutionary biologists have long wondered how it is that
costly traits that benefit the fitness of unrelated individuals
can be adaptive (Darwin 1859; Herre et al. 1999; Bronstein
et al. 2003; Sachs et al. 2004). The puzzle is especially acute
for mutualisms in which individuals encounter and interact with multiple partners from the environment, as
their fitness interests often conflict (Bull and Rice 1991;
Noë and Hammerstein 1995; West et al. 2002b, 2002c;
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Sachs and Wilcox 2006). In such mutualisms, selection
will favor any individual with a mutation that increases
its own fitness by increasing fitness benefits received from
partners and/or reducing the fitness cost of benefits provided to partners. In the absence of counterselection, this
evolutionary trajectory destabilizes the mutualism.
One proposed counterselection mechanism follows the
metaphor of a “biological market” (Noë and Hammerstein
1994, 1995; Hammerstein 2001; Noë 2001; Simms and
Taylor 2002). In this extended metaphor, controlling individuals choose “trading partners” from a market of potential “traders” (Noë and Hammerstein 1994). Partners
are chosen according to their relative quality, quantified
as the fitness benefits they provide minus the costs they
impose. For such choice to maintain cooperation and
hence mutualism, controlling individuals must accurately
target fitness benefits to high-quality partners (Bshary and
Grutter 2002; Simms and Taylor 2002; Foster and Kokko
2006). However, biological market theory does not consider how such targeting may be achieved, implicitly assuming that the controlling individuals have complete
control over “payments” in their market transactions. In
reality, the allocation of rewards is likely to be determined
by a biological process that gives both parties some degree
of control. In this article, we ask how such an allocation
mechanism affects the predictions from biological market
theory, using a mathematical model of the symbiosis between legumes and rhizobia.
Rhizobia are soil-dwelling alpha- and beta-proteobacteria that form nitrogen-fixation symbioses with many legumes (Sprent 2007; Masson-Boivin et al. 2009). Rhizobia
infect legume roots, stimulate hosts to produce nodules,
and differentiate into specialized endosymbiotic cells called
bacteroids, which reduce atmospheric dinitrogen in exchange for plant photosynthates (Trainer and Charles
2006; Prell et al. 2009). Several aspects of the symbiosis
decouple plant and rhizobial fitness. Rhizobia are transmitted horizontally among hosts and not vertically
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through seeds (Sprent et al. 1987), and symbiotic rhizobia
likely derive fitness benefits through release into the soil
from senescing nodules (Kiers et al. 2003; Denison and
Kiers 2004; Simms et al. 2006; Heath and Tiffin 2009).
Further, individual plants usually host multiple rhizobial
genotypes (Dowling and Broughton 1986; Hagen and
Hamrick 1996; Burdon et al. 1999; Thrall et al. 2000; Sachs
et al. 2009), making them vulnerable to free riders, which
are endosymbiotic rhizobia that hoard plant resources
rather than investing in the energy-intensive nitrogenfixation reaction (Denison 2000; Trainer and Charles 2006;
Ratcliff et al. 2008). In response, host legumes might select
against less-mutualistic rhizobia by targeting resources to
more-mutualistic partners (Denison 2000; Simms and Taylor 2002). Several empirical studies (Singleton and Stockinger 1983; Singleton and van Kessel 1987; Kiers et al.
2003, 2006; Simms et al. 2006) have supported key components of this hypothesis, which has been termed “plant
sanctions” (Denison 2000; West et al. 2002c) and “partner
choice” (Simms and Taylor 2002).
The existing conception of plant sanctions implicitly
assumes that legume hosts completely control resource
allocation. However, selection will favor any rhizobia that
can “manipulate” plant resource allocation, which makes
it likely that the allocation of resources is ultimately under
joint control. It is not clear whether plants lacking absolute
control over rhizobial fitness can exert selection in favor
of more cooperative rhizobia. Furthermore, although several reports have found support for plant sanctions, others
have not (Marco et al. 2009; Gubry-Rangin et al. 2010).
This suggests that the mechanisms determining fitness
costs and benefits might produce sanctions under some
conditions but not under others, which leads to the question of when each case is expected. Finally, plant sanctions
have often been conceptualized as all-or-none, where a
partner is either cut off or not (Denison 2000; West et al.
2002c), whereas plants are likely to adjust rewards to a
nodule much more continuously, for example, by adjusting the carbon allocation to each nodule. Using either
naturally occurring strains (Simms et al. 2006) or experimental manipulation of atmospheric N availability to
nodules (Kiers et al. 2006), studies have found that nodule
growth exhibits continuous variation that correlates with
strain performance (or N concentration in the air), suggesting that plant allocation of resources also varies continuously. When sanctions are not binary and partners
vary in quality, questions arise regarding how much the
plant should reward each partner and how this value is
determined.
A recent model by Akçay and Roughgarden (2007) is
useful for answering these questions. In keeping with the
trade metaphor, this model considers cooperation as the
outcome of biochemical “negotiations” between the plant

and the rhizobia. In contrast to the purely plant-controlled
sanctions model, the negotiation model affords both partners some degree of control over the outcome and predicts
a stable division of benefits to each party. Akçay and
Roughgarden (2007) proposed that this kind of negotiation process might underlie differential rewarding of nodules. However, they did not venture beyond the simplest
case of a single nodule on one plant and did not model
variation in rhizobium traits that would make rhizobia
more or less mutualistic. Here, we address these issues by
extending their negotiation model to the case of two nodules on a single plant. Our results challenge important
aspects of the prevailing theories of partner choice and
plant sanctions.
Our negotiation model is meant to represent an underlying biological process during which both partners in
a mutualism can exert control over the outcome of an
interaction. In “Mechanisms for Control of the Mutualism” in the online edition of the American Naturalist, we
review the current knowledge of possible mechanisms of
control by each party in the legume-rhizobium symbiosis.
The plant has a number of possible mechanisms for regulating the allocation of resources to the nodule, including
adjusting the oxygen flux into the nodule’s cortex
(Denison 2000) and regulating the active transport of C4
dicarboxylic acids (Benedito et al. 2010). There is much
less known about the mechanisms by which rhizobia can
control the outcome, but this situation is due partly to
methodological difficulties and partly to a tacit assumption
that the plant is in complete control. One potential pathway of rhizobium control might involve regulating the
cycling of amino acids, which has been implicated in the
symbiosis between pea plants and Rhizobium leguminosarum (Lodwig and Poole 2003; Prell et al. 2009), but this
hypothesis has yet to be tested. Nonetheless, as we show
below, several empirical observations regarding legumerhizobium mutualisms can be better explained under an
assumption of joint control via a negotiation-like mechanism than under the assumption of pure plant control.
We therefore hope that our results will spark empirical
research into mechanisms by which rhizobia can exert
control over resource allocation decisions; to that end, we
point out potentially fruitful avenues for empirical research in “Discussion.”
The Negotiation Model with Two Nodules
We model the negotiation process between a legume host
and two nodules, each occupied by a single rhizobial genotype, on the basis of the dynamics introduced by Akçay
and Roughgarden (2007). We label the nodules N1 and
N2. The carbon flux into and nitrogen flux out of N1 and
N2 are denoted (IC1, IA1) and (IC2, IA2), respectively (C is
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for carbon and A for ammonium or amino acid). These
fluxes give rise to growth rates rp, rN1, and rN2 for the plant,
nodule 1, and nodule 2, respectively. Akçay and Roughgarden (2007) use simple metabolic models to derive the
growth of the plant and the nodule as functions of the
carbon and nitrogen fluxes; we use slightly modified versions of their growth rates (see “Different Growth Functions” in the online edition of the American Naturalist).
Our results are qualitatively unchanged when different
growth functions are used, as long as these functions exhibit diminishing benefits from the resource received (i.e.,
nitrogen for the plant and carbon for the nodules) and
accelerating costs for the resource given up (carbon for
the plant, nitrogen for the nodules). Plant growth rate is
a function of the total nitrogen flux received from the
nodules and the carbon flux allocated to them, that is,
rp(IAt, ICt), where IAt p IA1 ⫹ IA2 and I Ct p I C1 ⫹ I C2, while
the growth rate of each nodule depends only on the carbon
flux it receives and the nitrogen it exports.
Like Akçay and Roughgarden (2007), we assume that
at each negotiation step there are small, stochastic fluctuations in the carbon flowing into and the nitrogen flowing out of one of the nodules, say N1, which brings the

growth rates of the plant and the nodules to rp, rN1
, and


rN2. This creates three possible cases: (1) rp 1 rp and


rN1
1 rN1; (2) rp ! rp and rN1
! rN1; or (3) one growth rate
is higher, and the other is lower. In the first two cases,
there is no conflict between the nodule and the plant. In
case 1, the new rates are accepted, and in case 2, the rates
revert back to the previous values. In the third case, however, one player’s growth rate is lowered. This player responds by shutting down the fluxes completely, which represents an effort on this player’s part to regain the more
advantageous previous fluxes. This move triggers a phase
during which both players stop exchanging nutrients and
therefore forgo the growth resulting from this exchange.
We call this phase the “war-of-attrition game,” because of
its similarity to models of animal conflicts where individuals engage in costly behavior (by displaying, fighting, or
simply waiting) to wear down their opponent and obtain
a resource (Bishop and Cannings 1978).
The duration over which each party stays in the warof-attrition game is determined by its potential gain from
winning this stage of the game and its opportunity cost
of staying in the war of attrition. Akçay and Roughgarden
(2007) proposed that each party stays in the war of attrition until its potential gain equals its loss. Suppose that

rp 1 rp but rN1
! rN1. If the fraction of the period the plant
stays in is given by p, we have
p(rp ⫺ rp, 2 ) p (1 ⫺ p)(r ⫺ rp ),

p

(1)

where rp, 2 denotes the growth rate that the plant can
achieve with its other nodule (N2) alone. We assume that

a nodule cannot grow when not receiving carbon fluxes
from the plant, so we have, for the fraction of time q that
nodule N1 stays in the game,


qrN1
p (1 ⫺ q)(rN1 ⫺ rN1
).

(2)

If p 1 q, the plant wins, and the new growth rates of the

plant and N1 are rp and rN1
. (N2 is unaffected by the
negotiation between the plant and N1.) In the one-nodule
case, where rp, 2 p 0, these negotiation dynamics lead to
the maximum of the product of rp and rN1, which in bargaining theory is called the “Nash bargaining solution”
(Nash 1950, 1953) and has been proposed by Roughgarden
et al. (2006) as an alternative to the Nash equilibrium as
an outcome of behavioral dynamics between animals. In
the two-nodule case, we are interested in whether and how
the plant can use the negotiation process to distinguish
between rhizobia of differing mutualistic quality and reward them accordingly, a phenomenon that has variously
been termed “plant sanctions” (Denison 2000; West et al.
2002c) and “partner choice” (Simms and Taylor 2002).
Variation in Partner Quality and Negotiation
To model variation in partner quality, we introduce a rhizobium trait that modulates the negotiation behavior of
a nodule. Suppose that a rhizobium strain occupying N1,
instead of staying in the war-of-attrition game for a fraction q of the time, as given by equation (2), stays for a
time bN1q, with b N1 1 0. Thus, strains with higher b will
stay in the war-of-attrition stage longer, making them less
likely to accept losses in their growth rate and more likely
to impose losses on the plant’s growth rate. In anthropomorphic terms, these strains are more “stubborn” during negotiations. In a single-nodule setup, the outcome of
negotiation with such strains would be skewed toward
benefitting the nodule to the detriment of the plant. Thus,
strains with high b would appear as low-quality partners
(fig. 1).
At the long-term equilibrium of the negotiation dynamics, all new rates will be rejected and the following
conditions hold for a focal nodule N1: (1) no alternative
pair of rates R  exists that is simultaneously more beneficial
to both the nodule and the plant; (2) for rp 1 rp and


rN1
! rN1, bq 1 p; and (3) for rp ! rp and rN1
1 rN1, p 1 bq.
For small fluctuations around the equilibrium, these three
conditions can be summarized into a first-order condition:
⭸rp
1
1 ⭸r
⫹ b N1 ∗ N1 p 0,
r ⫺ rp, 2 ⭸IA1
rN1 ⭸IA1

(3)

⭸rp
1
1 ⭸r
⫹ b N1 ∗ N1 p 0,
r ⫺ rp, 2 ⭸I C1
rN1 ⭸I C1

(4)

∗
p

∗
p
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Figure 1: Change in the growth rates of the plant and the nodule in a single-nodule case, where the equilibrium is given by equations (3)
and (4), with rp, 2 p 0. The solid line represents the plant’s growth rate, rp∗, and the dashed line represents the nodule’s, rN1.

∗
where rp∗ and rN1
are the equilibrium growth rates of the
plant and N1, respectively, and rp, 2 is the growth rate that
the plant can achieve by relying only on N2 while the
carbon and nitrogen fluxes with N1 remain shut down.
Similarly, the outcome of the negotiation with N2 is
characterized by the following conditions:

⭸rp
1
1 ⭸r
⫹ b N2 ∗ N2 p 0,
rp∗ ⫺ rp, 1 ⭸IA2
rN2 ⭸IA2

(5)

⭸rp
1
1 ⭸r
⫹ b N2 ∗ N2 p 0,
r ⫺ rp, 1 ⭸I C2
rN2 ⭸I C2

(6)

∗
p

where rp, 1 is the growth rate the plant can achieve by
relying only on N1. The quantities rp, 1 and rp, 2 represent
the “outside options” available to the plant and determine
how long the plant can “hold out” during the war-ofattrition stage. Intuitively, the equilibrium outcome balances the gains of the plant and each nodule, given by the
partial derivatives of rp, rN1 and rN2, relative to their opportunity costs of holding out during negotiations, given
by the denominators in each term. The relative gains of
the rhizobia are weighted by their b traits. The opportunity
cost for the plant depends on its outside options when
negotiating with a given nodule, which in general will be
a function of the external environment and all partners’
traits.

Outside Options and Plant Sanctions
The Outside Option Equals the Current Rates
The war-of-attrition phase with a focal nodule is the crucial
determinant of the long-term negotiation outcome. Its
outcome depends on the growth rate the plant can achieve
with the other nodule only, that is, the plant’s outside
option. This outside option determines how much “bargaining power” the plant holds vis-à-vis the negotiating
nodule. We first consider the case where, when negotiating
with N1, the plant simply maintains the current nitrogen
and carbon fluxes with N2. Thus, the plant’s growth rate
during the war-of-attrition phase with N1 is given by
rp, 2 p rp(IA2 , I C2 ).

(7)

Similarly, the outside option when negotiating with N2 is
given by rp, 1 p rp(IA1, I C1). Hence, at equilibrium, the
∗
∗
plant’s outside options will be rp, 1 p rp(IA1
, I C1
) and
∗
∗
rp, 2 p rp(IA2 , I C2 ). Substituting these terms into equations
(3)–(6), we can find the equilibrium nitrogen fixation and
carbon allocation rates for particular pairs of strains with
bN1 and bN2. Furthermore, by the implicit-function theorem, we can express the equilibrium fluxes of carbon to
and nitrogen from the nodules as functions of bN1 and
bN2. To find how the equilibrium fluxes change with changing bs, we take the total derivative of each of the four
equations with respect to bN1 and bN2 and solve the resulting eight equations for the eight partial derivatives
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∗
∗
∗
⭸IA1
/⭸b N1, ⭸I C1
/⭸b N1, ⭸IA1
/⭸b N2, and so on, as a function of
the first and second derivatives of the growth rate functions
at the equilibrium. We found analytical expressions for
these partial derivatives, but they are too cumbersome to
reproduce here. Instead, we compared the growth rates of
two nodules with different bs by evaluating the equilibrium conditions numerically (fig. 2). The nodule with the
higher b always has a higher growth rate. Thus, a negotiation process in which the current rates represent the
plant’s outside option will not lead to effective sanctions
by the plant, since it fails to withhold rewards from the
less beneficial strain.
This result can be understood intuitively by considering
the plant’s negotiation with one of the nodules, say N1.
With constant outside options, a nodule with higher b
always receives a higher growth rate because it is less likely
to accept losses during negotiation. In turn, paying a
higher price for nitrogen from a tougher negotiator in N1
diminishes the plant’s outside option when negotiating
with N2. This shift gives the plant a poorer equilibrium
bargain with N2, which further depresses the plant’s outside option against N1 (i.e., rp, 2).

Temporary Redirecting of Fluxes
In the previous subsection, we assumed that the plant does
not use the carbon withheld during the attrition phase to
improve its outside option. We now suppose that, when
locked in a war of attrition with N1, the plant redirects a
fraction r of the carbon flux IC1 (that would have gone to
N1) to N2 and in return receives an added nitrogen flux
at rate kN2rIC1, with k ≥ 0. Here, k stands for a strainspecific rhizobium trait that quantifies how much the
strain (temporarily) ramps up nitrogen fixation when supplied with additional carbohydrates: a strain with high k
supplies the plant with more extra nitrogen than does a
strain with lower k. We assume that the added nitrogen
fixation and exchange of fluxes operate at a very short
timescale and hence are not themselves subject to negotiation. When the plant redirects its carbon flux, its growth
rate while in the war of attrition becomes
rp, 2 p rp(IA2 ⫹ rk N2 I C1, I C2 ⫹ rI C1),

growth rate than a strain with higher b, provided that its
k is sufficiently larger than the high-b strain’s k (fig. 3).
Thus, for the plant to effectively impose sanctions against
high-b rhizobia, there must be a negative correlation between the b and k traits of the strains.
The intuition underlying this result is simple: the plant
benefits by relying on a strain with high k for temporary
nitrogen needs in a way that is similar to a firm manager
who hires substitute workers when the union goes on
strike. A strain with higher k improves the outside option
for the plant, allowing it to drive a tougher bargain with
the other nodule. Thus, a low-b strain with high k can
offset the bargaining advantage of a high-b, low-k nodule,
drive down the latter’s growth rate, and make plant sanctions appear effective.

(8)
Soil Nitrogen

and similarly for rp, 1,
rp, 1 p rp(IA1 ⫹ rk N1I C2 , I C1 ⫹ rI C2 ).

Figure 2: Comparison of growth rates of nodules with different b
traits. The black region denotes pairs of bN1 and bN2 for which N2
has a higher growth rate than N1, rN2 1 rN1; the white region denotes
pairs for which N1 has a greater growth rate than N2, rN1 1 rN2. The
region above the diagonal is black, which means that the nodule
with the higher b always has a higher growth rate than the nodule
with the lower b. Thus, under the assumption that the outside option
equals current rates, negotiations cannot produce effective sanctions.

(9)

When all else is equal, increasing a strain’s k has little
influence on the equilibrium growth rate of its own nodule
but decreases the equilibrium growth rate of the other
nodule (see Mathematica code, available through the online edition of the American Naturalist). When a plant
hosts two strains of rhizobia, one with low and the other
with high b, the low-b strain can have a higher equilibrium

Another outside option for the plant is to take up mineral
nitrogen from the soil. However, increasing nitrogen uptake from the soil requires growing new roots, which is
unlikely to happen fast enough to affect nitrogen uptake
during the brief war-of-attrition stage. We therefore include the effect of a constant nitrogen uptake from the
soil by adding it to the plant’s total nitrogen supply. As
we show in “Mineral Nitrogen Uptake from the Soil” in
the online edition of the American Naturalist, allowing for
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Figure 3: Comparison of the growth rates of nodules with different (b, k) pairs. As in figure 2, the black regions indicate when N2 has a
higher growth rate than N1, and vice versa for white regions. We assume that bN2 1 bN1 ; the X-axis in each panel shows the difference in
the b traits. Therefore, black regions correspond to cases where negotiations lead to ineffective sanctions (higher growth rate of less cooperative,
higher-b nodules), while the white regions correspond to effective sanctions. The figure shows that effective sanctions are possible when
kN1 is sufficiently greater than kN2, with the threshold difference being an increasing function of bN2 ⫺ bN1. Here, r p 0.5.

mineral nitrogen uptake does not affect the growth rate
relationship between two nodules with different b and k
traits. In other words, the conditions under which plant
sanctions appear to be effective are qualitatively unchanged. However, higher mineral uptake rates move the negotiation equilibria in the plant’s favor for a given value
of rhizobium b and, at the same time, increase the selection
pressure for higher b, all else being equal. This happens
because increasing the availability of nonnegotiated nitrogen improves the plant’s bargaining position, which decreases rhizobium growth rate. As the nodule’s growth as
a function of b is concave (as can be seen in fig. 1), this
increases the marginal benefit of increasing b. In other
words, as the nodule’s bargaining position deteriorates,
the advantage of being a tougher negotiator (i.e., having
a higher b) increases. Empirical research on mycorrhizae
supports this prediction (Johnson 1993): when big blue-

stem plants were fertilized, less beneficial fungal species
took over their roots. Kiers et al. (2002) note that no
conclusive data exist for the evolutionary response of rhizobia to nitrogen fertilization and go on to argue that the
effect of increased nitrogen fertilization on the evolution
of rhizobium effectiveness is ambiguous, as plant sanctions
might counteract the effect of reduced plant dependence
on nodules. Our model suggests otherwise.
Effect of Negotiations on Plant’s Growth Rate
Here, we compare the plant’s growth rate when it hosts
different strains in the two nodules (i.e., has an opportunity to exert choice) with that when it hosts the same
strain in both nodules. Figure 4 shows that in most cases,
the plant’s growth rate with choice is intermediate between
its growth rates with each strain alone. However, for some
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Figure 4: Effect of choice on plant’s growth rate. This figure compares the plant’s growth rate when it has a choice between two strains
with negotiation traits (bN1, kN1) and (bN2, kN2) with its growth rate when it is infected with either of the strains alone. Here, bN1 p 1,
kN1 p 0, and r p 0.5. The gray points correspond to a plant that has an intermediate growth rate when it has a choice, relative to a plant
that hosts either of the strains alone. The black points correspond to a plant that has a lower growth rate when it has a choice, relative to
a plant that hosts either of the strains alone. This happens when the higher-b strain also has a higher k.

combinations of b and k, the plant’s growth rate is lower
when it has a choice than when it is infected with only
the worse strain. This happens when a high-b, high-k strain
is paired with a lower-b, lower-k one, which is roughly
the opposite of the conditions that make plant sanctions
effective.
To understand this rather counterintuitive result, consider first what happens when a plant hosts high-b, highk strains in both nodules. Both nodules drive a hard bargain, yet during the negotiation phase, each also gives the
plant temporarily increased nitrogen fluxes that improve
the plant’s bargaining position. These two effects counteract each other, giving the plant an intermediate growth
rate. Conversely, a low-b, low-k strain will accept losses
readily yet will not grant the plant good outside options
when it is negotiating with a competing nodule, again
resulting in an intermediate growth rate for the plant.
When these two strains are paired on the same plant,
however, the high-b strain can take advantage of the plant’s
weak bargaining position, created by the low k of the other
strain, while at the same time being very unwilling to
accept losses during the negotiation. This situation reduces
the plant’s growth rate below that reached with either
strain alone. Furthermore, the plant cannot exercise effective sanctions under these conditions and ends up rewarding the high-b nodule disproportionately.

Negotiation and the Evolution of Cooperative Rhizobia
To ask how the negotiated outcomes affect the evolutionary dynamics of the rhizobium traits b and k, we assume
that the fitness of the rhizobium strain occupying a nodule

is reflected in the growth rate of the nodule. We conduct
an invasion fitness analysis in a monomorphic population
with resident values br and kr by considering the growth
rate of a mutant strain when it coinfects a plant with the
resident strain. By implicit differentiation of the first-order
conditions (eqq. [3]–[6]) and using the expressions (8)
and (9) for the outside options, we calculate the partial
derivatives of the growth rate of a mutant nodule rm with
respect to its negotiation traits, bm and km, and evaluate
these derivatives at bm p br and k m p k r. Under the assumptions of adaptive dynamics, these derivatives give the
direction of evolutionary change of the population averages of b and k in the absence of a covariance between
these traits (Dieckmann and Law 1996; Brown et al. 2007).
The vector field depicting the gradient of the invasion
fitness for a range of resident b and k values (fig. 5a)
shows that selection will uniformly act to increase b. The
selection gradient acting on k is mostly flat, except when
the resident has a high b, in which case there is weak
selection for intermediate values of kr. Selection on k is
mostly flat because a nodule’s k trait affects its own growth
rate only indirectly, through its effect on the other nodule’s
negotiation equilibrium. Therefore, the effect of k on a
strain’s own fitness can be thought of as a second-order
effect.
To check whether these results carry over to a more
realistic population with many rhizobial strains, we conducted simulations of diverse rhizobium populations with
different correlations between b and k. These simulations
(see Mathematica code for details) confirm that, regardless
of the correlation between the two traits, the highest-b
strains almost always win out in the long term.
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during the transient negotiation dynamics, strains with
higher b spend less time growing because they spend more
time in the war-of-attrition phase than do strains with
lower b. This cost is not accounted for in our analyses
above, which consider only the equilibrium of the negotiation dynamics. Akçay and Roughgarden (2007) found
in their simulations that the war-of-attrition stage imposed, on average, a roughly 7% cost, relative to the same
nitrogen fixation and carbon fluxes reached by a cost-free
process. This cost will be higher for high-b strains, because
they will stay in the war-of-attrition stage longer, and it
might eventually grow so large as to negate the advantage
of increasing b.
Partner fidelity feedback (PFF), that is, benefits that
rhizobia obtain from increased plant growth rate, might
also constrain b. Intuitively, PFF must play some role in
the legume-rhizobium symbiosis, since plants that grow
more also photosynthesize more and have more resources
available for dividing among themselves and their symbionts. To model the effect of PFF, suppose that the lifetime
fitness of nodule N1 is given by
w N1 p rN1rps ,

Figure 5: Vector field depicting the selection gradients on the negotiation traits, b and k. Panel a is for the case without partner
fidelity feedback (PFF; s p 0 in eq. [10]), and b is for the case with
PFF (s p 1). In a, there is selection to increase b throughout its
range, while selection to increase k is weak when b is small but
becomes stronger as b grows. Selection gets weaker on each trait as
it increases in magnitude. In b, there is still selection to increase b,
but the magnitude of this selection is weaker than that in a. In
contrast, there is strong selection to increase k because k helps the
plant’s growth rate, which yields a payoff to the rhizobia through
PFF while imposing no direct cost.

These results show that plant sanctions through negotiation, even when effective at the level of a single plant,
are still unable to maintain beneficial rhizobia in the population. The fundamental reason for this result is that the
negotiation process allows a nodule with a high b to “manipulate” the plant into providing it with more carbon.
To resist this manipulation, the plant must rely on strains
with higher k. But even if these strains fare better when
they cohabit a plant with a high-b, low-k strain, they do
much worse when they are the sole occupant, since the
plant can then play two high-k nodules against each other.
Thus, high-b strains are able to invade a population of
low-b strains, regardless of their k values.
Partner Fidelity Feedback
What constrains b from increasing indefinitely? One possibility is that a higher b imposes costs on the rhizobium:

(10)

where s ≥ 0 is a parameter denoting the strength of PFF.
When s p 0, there is no automatic fitness benefit to the
nodule from the plant’s growth; s 1 0 implies some benefit,
which becomes stronger as s increases. Although this benefit could be derived from a model that accounts for
growth and reproduction of both the nodule and the plant,
s provides a simple way to account for PFF. Note that the
behavior of the parties during the negotiation is still based
on the growth rates of the plant (rp) and the nodule (rN1),
as opposed to being determined by the fitness function
wN1. To assume otherwise would require that the partners
exchange information about their growth rates and anticipate future returns, both capabilities that we are reluctant
to ascribe to plants and bacteria.
To find how PFF affects the selection gradients for b
and k, we again calculate the derivatives of rhizobial fitness
given by equation (10) with respect to these traits (fig. 5).
Adding PFF (e.g., when s p 1) favors higher k and does
so more strongly as b increases. This is because hosting
strains with high k increases the growth rate of the plant,
which then yields a return on the rhizobium fitness
through PFF. Positive selection to increase b is diminished
but has not vanished. Nonetheless, the strong selection for
increased k arising from PFF, together with a negative covariance between k and b, can maintain low-b strains in
the population. To illustrate this, we computed the evolutionarily stable (ES) (b, k) pairs as a function of the PFF
exponent s, assuming a negative, linear relationship between b and k (fig. 6). The evolutionarily stable b decreases
with the PFF exponent s, meaning that the ES rhizobia
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Figure 6: Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) values of b (a) and k (b) as a function of the partner fidelity feedback (PFF) exponent s.
Here, we assume a negative, linear relationship between b and k, with two different values for the slope. For the solid curve, we assume
k p 0.6 ⫺ 0.3b, while the dashed curve is drawn under the assumption k p 1.2 ⫺ 0.6b . In each case, the maximum value of b is assumed
to be 2 (making k nonnegative). While the particular value of this upper limit is arbitrarily chosen for our numerical calculations, its
empirical value can be interpreted as corresponding to the least cooperative strain in the population. As can be seen, this least cooperative
strain will be evolutionarily stable up to a threshold PFF coefficient s, and only for higher s will more-cooperative strains be able to persist
in the population. This threshold s is lower when the relationship between b and k is more negative.

become more cooperative with stronger PFF. Further, for
a given value of the PFF coefficient s, a more negative
relationship between b and k will decrease the ES value
of b and increase the ES value of k.
Discussion
Negotiation Can Undermine Partner Choice/Sanctions
and Creates Context Dependency
Our model yields four main results. First, the correlation
between the rhizobium negotiation traits b and k affects
the plant’s ability to reward more-cooperative strains.
When b and k are negatively correlated, strains that demand less carbon per nitrogen fixed also provide the plant
with better outside options; moreover, negotiation provides higher rewards for the more cooperative rhizobium
strain. This combination enables plant sanctions. However,
negotiation disables plant sanctions when these traits are
not negatively correlated. These results partially support
the conjecture by Akçay and Roughgarden (2007) that the
negotiation process might underlie plant sanctions, yet
they also illuminate a more complex picture where effective sanctions depend on the combination of strains coinfecting the host plant. These findings also provide a possible explanation for the empirical results that show
effective plant sanctions in some cases (Kiers et al. 2003,
2006; Simms et al. 2006) but not in all (Marco et al. 2009;
Gubry-Rangin et al. 2010).
Our second result is that negotiation creates contextdependent variation in the plant’s fitness costs and benefits. Context dependency here refers to the fact that the
negotiation outcome and its effect on the plant’s overall
growth depend on the combination of strains with which

the plant is interacting. In particular, with certain combinations of strains (low-b, low-k strains paired with highb, high-k strains), a plant might be worse off when it has
a “choice” between two strains than when it is infected by
either strain alone. This prediction might explain the results of an inoculation experiment by Heath and Tiffin
(2007), in which Medicago truncatula plants were sometimes less fit when they had a choice (i.e., inoculated with
two Sinorhizobium medicae strains that offered different
levels of benefit) than when inoculated with either strain
alone. This result is paradoxical from a naive markettheory perspective but arises naturally from an underlying
negotiation model where exerting choice is predicated on
having good outside options.
Maintenance of Mutualism Requires Both
Partner Fidelity Feedback and Sanctions
Our third result is that, regardless of the correlation between k and b, selection always favors higher b, even when
plants can successfully reward lower-b nodules. This result
underscores a general point about sanction models that
seems to have been overlooked so far. Consider two symbiont strains that interact with a single host species. Suppose that strain 1 is the more cooperative strain; that is,
the host grows better when singly inoculated by strain 1.
Denote by wij the fitness of strain i when it coinfects the
host with strain j. Effective host sanctions should result in
w12 1 w21; that is, when both strains infect a single host,
strain 1 has a higher fitness than does strain 2. On the
other hand, the evolutionary stability of strain 1 requires
w11 1 w21, and conversely, the evolutionarily stability of
strain 2 requires w22 1 w12. In general, effective host sanctions do not guarantee or preclude either condition. For
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example, our model without PFF generates the following
pattern: w22 1 w12 1 w21 1 w11. Thus, even effective host
sanctions cannot maintain strain 1 in the population.
Our final result is that both sanctions and partner fidelity feedback (PFF; Bull and Rice 1991; Sachs et al. 2004;
Foster and Wenseleers 2006) might be necessary to maintain mutualism. West et al. (2002c) showed that PFF alone
is not sufficient to maintain cooperative rhizobia, because
the feedback benefits that a cooperative strain produces
by helping the host are diluted across all nodules, regardless of strain, giving rise to a “tragedy of the commons.”
This effect is present in our model as well: even with PFF,
selection favors higher b, albeit with diminished strength.
On the other hand, our second negotiation trait, k, does
not suffer from the commons tragedy, because while higher
k in a focal nodule improves the plant’s position against
the other nodule, it does not directly affect the negotiation
outcome between the focal nodule and the plant. Hence,
a focal nodule’s k value affects its own growth rate only
indirectly, by changing the plant’s baseline growth rate
(this effect is small but positive). On the other hand, with
PFF, a higher-k strain receives feedback benefits from improving the plant’s growth, which means that PFF strongly
favors higher k. Nonetheless, favoring high k does not by
itself maintain low-b strains. For this to occur, k and b
must be negatively correlated, which brings us back to the
condition for effective plant sanctions. Note, however, that
sanctions here play a rather incidental role; their existence
is a side consequence of adequate negative correlation between the negotiation traits.
Control and Outside Options in Biological Markets
The main thrust of our article is that whenever rhizobia
have some control over the outcome, the plant must rely
on other rhizobia to sanction less cooperative ones, at least
in the short term. This basic fact creates evolutionary and
ecological patterns that are more complex than those from
pure host-control models (e.g., West et al. 2002c). Our
model provides possible explanations for empirically observed patterns that had not been anticipated by previous
sanctions models, a fact that offers indirect support for
our model and for rhizobium control in general. More
generally, the issue of joint control of the mutualistic outcome and its effects on evolutionary and ecological dynamics presents a fertile ground for future theoretical and
empirical work.
The partner-choice model of Kummel and Salant (2006)
in a mycorrhizal mutualism offers an interesting comparison in this regard. Kummel and Salant characterize each
fungal strain by an exchange function that describes how
much resource the strain yields in exchange for a given
amount of carbon. The plant then allocates carbon in a

way that equalizes the marginal costs of obtaining resources from the strains that it chooses. Even though Kummel and Salant did not consider fungal fitness in their
paper, their model can also yield cases with ineffective
sanctions, that is, where the less beneficial strain is evolutionarily stable despite optimal partner choice by the
plant (E. Akçay, unpublished analysis). One possible interpretation is that this outcome arises because plant
choices are constrained by the set of available supply
curves, which is determined by the fungal population’s
composition. Hence, plants in this model lack complete
control over the allocation of rewards and can exercise
choice only when interacting with the right combination
of fungal strains.
Another set of models, by Johnstone and Bshary (2002,
2008), explores how control over the interaction influences
the exchange of services in the cleaner-fish mutualism,
where there is conflict over the duration of the interaction
between an “exploiter” (cleaner fish) and a “victim” (client
fish). Johnstone and Bshary (2002) find that as exploiter
control increases, so too does the evolutionarily stable level
of exploitation, while the duration of each interaction decreases. Johnstone and Bshary (2008) add a market context
to this model, where interaction duration influences partner availability for both types of partners, and find that
the market cannot prevent the cooperation breakdown that
is caused by increased exploiter control. In one sense, the
control variable in Johnstone and Bshary (2002, 2008)
fulfills a role similar to that of b: it shifts the stable outcome
in the exploiter’s favor. A major difference between these
models and ours is that the clients in Johnstone and Bshary
(2008) have no way of retaliating against the cleaner’s
manipulation of interaction duration, either during the
interaction itself (e.g., by manipulating the exploitation
level) or by exercising outside options, such as visiting less
manipulative cleaners (e.g., chosen by reliable indicators
of their tendency to manipulate). Furthermore, their
model does not consider evolution of the control trait in
the cleaner population. Selection in their model would
always favor higher control by the exploiters (since there
is no immediate cost to higher control) and therefore lead
to the breakdown of cooperation, just as selection in our
model favors increased b.
We suggest that the next stage of biological market theory should include more-explicit models of the mechanisms determining the exchange rates for services and resources and the effect of outside options within these
mechanisms. Such models would require more detailed
knowledge of the proximate mechanisms of resource exchange (Bshary and Bronstein 2004), which often is not
immediately available. Nonetheless, models such as ours
underscore the importance of these mechanisms and provide a theoretical motivation for empirical inquiry into
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them. For example, from current knowledge that we review
in “Mechanisms for Control of the Mutualism,” we might
infer that plants have the upper hand in the legumerhizobium interaction. However, this view might just as
well reflect our relative ignorance about mechanisms of
rhizobial control. Methodological difficulties have hampered inquiry into how endosymbiotic bacteroids might
exert control during the nitrogen-fixation stage of the interaction. Further, most studies of bacteroid physiology
are purely mechanistic and focus on single nodules, rarely
if ever considering how bacteroid traits expressed in one
nodule might influence the trait expression and performance of strains in other nodules. In contrast, empirical
research on the regulation of nitrogen fixation adopts the
plant’s perspective and assumes plant control (e.g., Schulze
2004). We suggest that our approach can usefully merge
these two perspectives by integrating evolutionary theory
with a mechanistic approach to control and regulation of
the symbiosis. Such a synthesis produces many new empirical questions, some of which we consider below.
Rhizobium Traits and Empirical Questions
Our model predicts that the effect of a rhizobium strain
on the plant’s growth will depend on which other strains
occupy the other nodules of the plant. This kind of context
dependency poses a problem for defining and measuring
cooperativeness of rhizobium strains. In principle, a quantity such as the ratio of nitrogen fixation to carbon allocation, IA/I C, might denote how beneficial a nodule is to
the plant, but these rates will vary, depending on the other
strains being hosted by the same plant. Therefore, a strain’s
cooperativeness must be defined and measured within a
specified context, which challenges the use of terms such
as “cooperators” and “cheaters” to denote genotypespecific properties of rhizobia. Nonetheless, it is possible
to define a standard context in which to evaluate strains,
such as single inoculation, as is done in most empirical
studies (e.g., Simms et al. 2006; Heath and Tiffin 2009;
Heath 2010). In that case, our model posits that there is
more than one way to be cooperative: a strain can either
have a low b and thereby “demand” less during the negotiation process or have a high k and thereby help the
plant drive a harder bargain with another nodule. In a
single-strain inoculation, the strain’s b is evaluated in the
context of its k and its k is evaluated in the context of its
b, and the joint action of the two traits determines the
strain’s nitrogen-fixation level. Thus, to predict a strain’s
cooperativeness in other contexts (e.g., in mixed inoculations or in soil), we must understand what biological
mechanisms underlie such traits and determine how best
to measure them.
One can identify the rhizobium traits important to the

interaction outcome by investigating in detail the physiological mechanisms by which legumes and rhizobia interact. For example, a recent study by Ratcliff and Denison
(2009) showed that an ethylene inhibitor produced by
rhizobia shifts the symbiotic outcome in favor of the rhizobia. More research into the mechanistic basis for such
effects is needed. An evolutionary perspective suggests that
it might be especially profitable to find and study mechanisms underlying natural polymorphisms in functionally
relevant genes. Functional genetic studies of nitrogen fixation (Masson-Boivin et al. 2009) and cellular interactions
between plant and rhizobium cells (Lodwig et al. 2003;
Prell et al. 2009) should be conducted with an eye toward
uncovering such variability in rhizobial populations. Once
control traits have been identified, our model makes a
number of specific predictions about the outcome of the
mutualism as a function of different combinations of traits.
These predictions should be tested, as they have important
implications for the evolutionary dynamics of this
interaction.
Another way to test whether bacteroids exercise any
control in the interaction is to detect variation in these
unidentified traits by observing the fitness associations that
they create between mutualism partners. For example, b
is predicted to generate antagonistic covariation between
plant and rhizobium fitnesses. So variation in b can be
detected as a negative correlation between the fitnesses of
rhizobium and host plant across genetically identical host
plants that have been singly inoculated with different rhizobium genotypes. In turn, k is predicted to generate antagonistic variation between the fitnesses of strains that
coinfect a plant. Hence, variation in k can be detected by
measuring individual fitnesses of pairs of rhizobium genotypes inoculated onto different individual host plants,
with the pairs representing “cells” in a factorial array of
rhizobium combinations. One caveat is that a negative
genetic correlation between b and k might mask some
fitness covariances. Nonetheless, examining fitness covariances among plant genotypes and rhizobial strains and
determining whether such covariation maps onto specific
genetic loci in rhizobia is an area ripe for study. Few studies
have measured genetic variation and covariation between
the fitnesses of plants and rhizobia in either natural or
managed systems.

Future Directions for Theory
Our extension of the negotiation framework of Akçay and
Roughgarden (2007) to interactions with two nodules generates interesting insights about the evolution of the symbiosis but does not yet capture all important aspects of
the interaction. We briefly discuss some of these aspects,
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both to delineate limitations of our model and to sketch
out questions that we intend to tackle in future work.
First, we assume that the plant does not simply cut off
a nodule with high b. In the short term, such a move
would not be optimal for the plant, as the remaining nodule would have a much better bargaining position and
therefore be able to shift the outcome in its own favor. In
the longer term, however, the plant can replace the cutoff
nodule with one or more new nodules. More generally,
the number of nodules on a single plant is highly plastic,
and plants continue to “search” for more rhizobia and
initiate nodules while negotiating with existing nodules.
This means that the plant is not constrained by its current
outside options but instead might expand its outside options and gain advantage when dealing with existing nodules. The optimal nodulation strategy of the plant therefore
remains an important question to be answered by future
work.
Second, we assume that only nodule growth determines
rhizobial fitness. Nodule growth might be the appropriate
quantity for studying sanctions after nodule formation,
but the overall evolutionary dynamics of the rhizobia will
also depend on the number of nodules each strain initiates
(Heath and Tiffin 2009). Plants that host effective nodules
initiate fewer nodules (Gao et al. 2010; Gubry-Rangin et
al. 2010), which will have additional selective effects on
the soil population of rhizobia. Furthermore, strains differ
in their competitiveness for nodulation (e.g., Amarger
1981; Dowling and Broughton 1986), with potential tradeoffs between nitrogen fixation and nodulation effectiveness. Future theory, therefore, must address the nodulation
dynamics of the interaction.
A related issue is the evolutionary consequence of the
spatial population genetic structure of rhizobia (Bever and
Simms 2000). In a structured population, a rhizobium
strain might co-occur on a plant with others of its own
genotype more frequently than with a strain randomly
selected from the population. This situation would create
indirect fitness effects on the rhizobium traits, which will
be largely neutral for b (as b has little effect on the other
nodule), but negative for k (because higher k harms the
other nodule). An indirect cost of high k could counteract
some of the positive selection pressure on this trait. On
the other hand, spatial structure also makes it more likely
for rhizobia to compete with kin (West et al. 2002a), which
might negate some of the indirect costs and benefits of
rhizobium traits (depending also on population elasticity;
Platt and Bever 2009). Predicting which of these effects
will be stronger requires a model that more explicitly specifies the life cycle of rhizobia, including dispersal. Another
potential effect of spatial structure is to increase the chance
that the same plant and rhizobium genotypes interact repeatedly over generations, adding intergenerational part-

ner fidelity feedback to the “developmental” PFF that we
modeled here, with largely similar effects.
Finally, we have yet to consider variation in plant negotiation traits. Here, we have concentrated on the evolution of rhizobium traits. There is some justification to
this simplification, as rhizobia might be expected to evolve
faster than would plants. However, to fully understand
this mutualism, we must also consider plant traits and
their evolution. In particular, plants might also evolve to
be more or less “stubborn” during negotiations. Variation
in plant traits will likely influence the distribution of benefits and generate genotype-by-genotype interactions in
natural populations (Heath 2010). This question and the
question of coevolution of plant and rhizobial negotiation
traits we leave for future study.
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Akçay, E., and J. Roughgarden. 2007. Negotiation of mutualism:
rhizobia and legumes. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 274:25–32.
Amarger, N. 1981. Competition for nodule formation between effective and ineffective strains of Rhizobium meliloti. Soil Biology
and Biochemistry 13:475–480.
Benedito, V. A., H. Li, X. Dai, M. Wandrey, J. He, R. Kaundal, I.
Torres-Jerez, et al. 2010. Genomic inventory and transcriptional
analysis of Medicago truncatula transporters. Plant Physiology 152:
1716–1730.
Bever, J., and E. Simms. 2000. Evolution of nitrogen fixation in
spatially structured populations of Rhizobium. Heredity 85:366–
372.
Bishop, D., and C. Cannings. 1978. A generalized war of attrition.
Journal of Theoretical Biology 70:85–124.
Bronstein, J. L., W. G. Wilson, and W. F. Morris. 2003. Ecological
dynamics of mutualist/antagonist communities. American Naturalist 162(suppl.):S24–S39.
Brown, J. S., Y. Cohen, and T. L. Vincent. 2007. Adaptive dynamics
with vector-valued strategies. Evolutionary Ecology Research 9:
719–756.

Negotiation and Plant Sanctions 13
Bshary, R., and J. L. Bronstein. 2004. Game structures in mutualistic
interactions: what can evidence tell us about the kind of models
we need? Advances in the Study of Behavior 34:59–101.
Bshary, R., and A. S. Grutter. 2002. Experimental evidence that partner choice is a driving force in the payoff distribution among
cooperators or mutualists: the cleaner fish case. Ecology Letters 5:
130–136.
Bull, J. J., and W. R. Rice. 1991. Distinguishing mechanisms for the
evolution of co-operation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 149:63–
74.
Burdon, J. J., A. H. Gibson, S. D. Searle, M. J. Woods, and J. Brockwell. 1999. Variation in the effectiveness of symbiotic associations
between native rhizobia and temperate Australian Acacia: withinspecies interactions. Journal of Applied Ecology 36:398–408.
Darwin, C. 1859. On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for
life. J. Murray, London.
Denison, R. F. 2000. Legume sanctions and the evolution of symbiotic
cooperation by rhizobia. American Naturalist 156:567–576.
Denison, R. F., and E. T. Kiers. 2004. Lifestyle alternatives for rhizobia:
mutualism, parasitism, and forgoing symbiosis. FEMS Microbiology Letters 237:187–193.
Dieckmann, U., and R. Law. 1996. The dynamical theory of coevolution: a derivation from stochastic ecological processes. Journal
of Mathematical Biology 34:579–612.
Dowling, D. N., and W. J. Broughton. 1986. Competition for nodulation of legumes. Annual Review of Microbiology 40:131–157.
Foster, K. R., and H. Kokko. 2006. Cheating can stabilize cooperation
in mutualisms. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 273:2233–2239.
Foster, K. R., and T. Wenseleers. 2006. A general model for the
evolution of mutualisms. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 19:1283–
1293.
Gao, M., M. J. Barnett, S. R. Long, and M. Teplitski. 2010. Role of
the Sinorhizobium meliloti global regulator Hfq in gene regulation
and symbiosis. Molecular Plant-Microbe Interactions 23:355–365.
Gubry-Rangin, C., M. Garcia, and G. Béna. 2010. Partner choice in
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Noë, R., and P. Hammerstein. 1994. Biological markets: supply and
demand determine the effect of partner choice in cooperation,
mutualism and mating. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 35:
1–11.
———. 1995. Biological markets. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 10:
336–339.
Platt, T., and J. Bever. 2009. Kin competition and the evolution of
cooperation. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 24:370–377.
Prell, J., J. P. White, A. Bourdes, S. Bunnewell, R. J. Bongaerts, and
P. S. Poole. 2009. Legumes regulate rhizobium bacteroid development and persistence by the supply of branched-chain amino
acids. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
USA 106:12477–12482.
Ratcliff, W. C., and R. F. Denison. 2009. Rhizobitoxine producers
gain more poly-3-hydroxybutyrate in symbiosis than do competing
rhizobia, but reduce plant growth. ISME Journal 3:870–872.
Ratcliff, W. C., S. V. Kadam, and R. F. Denison. 2008. Poly-3hydroxybutyrate (PHB) supports survival and reproduction in
starving rhizobia. FEMS Microbiology Ecology 65:391–399.
Roughgarden, J., M. Oishi, and E. Akçay. 2006. Reproductive social
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